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Abstract
In our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, capital-constrained entre-
preneurs nance risky projects by borrowing from banks. Banks make loans using
equity and deposits. Because nancial contracts are non-state-contingent, bank
balance sheets are exposed to entrepreneurial defaults. Macroprudential policy im-
poses a positive response of the bank capital ratio to lending. Our main result is
that the Taylor Principle is violated when this response is too weak. Then macro-
prudential policy is ine¤ective in stabilising debt and monetary policy is subject to
nancial dominance. Under a constant bank capital requirement, a strong reaction
of the interest rate to ination destabilises the nancial sector.
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1 Introduction
A new policy domain has emerged in response to the nancial crisis, that of macropruden-
tial policy with the aim of safeguarding the stability of the nancial system as a whole.
Its transmission, e¤ectiveness and interdependence with other policy areas is not yet fully
understood. This paper sheds light on the implications of bank capital requirements for
the conduct of monetary policy.
Smets (2014) summarises three views on the interaction of monetary policy and nan-
cial stability. One view separates the two policy areas, their instruments and objectives
completely. Another regards the two policies as indistinguishable.1 Between these two
extremes, a more moderate view is that monetary policy may be a¤ected by the stance of
macroprudential policy and that it should take into account nancial stability concerns if
macroprudential tools prove ine¤ective. The model presented here supports the moderate
view. It shows that, when macroprudential policy is too lax and the nancial sector does
not absorb losses to a su¢ cient degree, monetary policy may be forced to become too
accommodating so as to reduce private sector debt and shore up bank balance sheets.
This is what we mean by nancial dominance, a term that appears in speeches by policy
makers (Hannoun, 2012; Weidmann, 2013), and in the academic literature (Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2013; Leeper and Nason, 2014).
We derive a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a banking
sector where entrepreneurs are subject to default risk. Borrowing by rms entails a
nancial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), henceforth
BGG (1999). Entrepreneurs operate under limited liability and have to nance their
projects by borrowing from banks. Since they are subject to default risk, external nance
is costly. Di¤erently from BGG (1999), however, debt contracts are non-state-contingent
and as a result, bank balance sheets are impaired by entrepreneurial defaults. This
model feature is similar to Zhang (2009), Benes and Kumhof (2011), and Clerc et al
(2014). Since banks are no longer perfectly insured against bad shocks, there is a role for
macroprudential policy to guard against bank defaults by imposing a minimum ratio of
bank capital to assets.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the model.
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
Our model allows us to reassess monetary policy as a stabilisation tool in the presence
of macroprudential instruments. In particular, the macroprudential authority imposes
a capital requirement on banks in the form of a minimum ratio of equity capital to
1For a paper representing the rst view, see Collard, Dellas, Diba and Loisel (2014). An example of
the second view is Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013).
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assets. This capital ratio forces banks to partly nance loans to entrepreneurs using
equity, which is more costly to banks than using deposit funding. A capital requirement
rule links the capital ratio to the amount of borrowing. We represent monetary policy
as a simple interest rate feedback rule as proposed by Taylor (1993). A loose monetary
policy stance implies, on the one hand, a fall in the return on deposits that boosts bank
prots and therefore bankersnet worth. On the other hand, the ensuing rise in ination
acts to reduce the real value of bank prots and thus bankersnet worth. Therefore, a
monetary policy that aims at stabilising bankers equity and borrowing actually needs
to move interest rates less than one-for-one in response to ination. The interest rate
rule coe¢ cient on ination that guarantees a unique model solution is shown to depend
critically on the calibration of the macroprudential instrument. If, for instance, the capital
ratio is held constant, the task of stabilising borrowing falls onto monetary policy, which
is forced to be more accommodating than is warranted to stabilise ination.
In the standard three-equation New Keynesian model, the well-known Taylor Prin-
ciple (see e.g. Woodford, 2001) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a unique
solution. In particular, the monetary authority should raise its policy instrument, the
nominal short term interest rate, by more than one percentage point if ination increases
by one percentage point. Intuitively, if policy makers do not respond enoughto interest
rate movements, i.e. the coe¢ cient on ination in the Taylor rule is below unity, the real
interest rate falls in response to increased ination. As a consequence, demand increases
as well as marginal costs, such that ination continues to rise. In the standard framework,
the monetary authority stabilises ination by following the Taylor Principle.
However, suppose instead that credit frictions result in the existence of debt contracts,
and that these debt contracts are in nominal terms. Then any rise in ination acts to
reduce the real value of outstanding debt, and as such can have a stabilising e¤ect on
debt dynamics. In that case, the Taylor Principle can be destabilising as it leads to
accelerating debt dynamics through the Fisher (1933) debt-deation channel. This has
been shown by Leeper (1991) for the case of scal dominancewhen borrowing is done
by the government and scal policy is ine¤ective in stabilising public debt.
In our model with borrowing by rms and a bank capital requirement rule, we obtain
a similar result for the case of nancial dominance, i.e. when the macroprudential policy
is ine¤ective in stabilising private debt. If the bank is not required to raise su¢ cient new
equity in response to a rise in credit demand, it ends up granting too much credit to
entrepreneurs and bank loans can be on an unstable path. In such a situation, ination
can help to reduce real debt levels and make debt dynamics sustainable. In other words:
a violation of the Taylor Principle is warranted.
Our contribution to the literature is a determinacy analysis under the joint setting of
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monetary and macroprudential policy to achieve the dual objectives of price stability and
nancial stability. The papers main nding, a novel result in the literature, mirrors the
scal dominance result pointed out by Leeper (1991), according to which an active scal
policy necessitates a passive monetary policy (and vice versa). Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1991) show that, if the government can issue only nominal debt, ination can be
used as a policy instrument in order to make the real value of debt state-contingent. In
this way, monetary policy can stabilise government debt when the appropriate scal in-
struments are absent. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) show that price stability, scal
sustainability and nancial stability are intimately intertwined. Kumhof et al (2010) ab-
stract from nancial frictions and analyse the link between scal sustainability and price
stability focussing on scal dominance. Here, we abstract from scal sustainability issues
by assuming that lump sum taxes are set to satisfy the government budget constraint
and analyse the link between nancial stability and price stability, focussing on nancial
dominance. Our result resembles that of Svensson (2013), who nds that a policy of
"leaning against the wind" is counterproductive in that it raises debt ratios instead of
reducing them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we outline
the model. Section 3 discusses the interdependence of macroprudential and monetary
policies. Section 4 presents a welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a monetary business cycle model with a nancial accelerator framework
as in BGG (1999). That is, entrepreneurs have insu¢ cient net worth to buy capital
and thus demand loans from banks. Due to the fact that entrepreneurs are subject to
idiosyncratic default risk, there exists a costly state verication problem whereby banks
incur monitoring costs when an entrepreneur declares default. In BGG, the nancial
intermediary is a veil and its balance sheet plays no role. This is because debt contracts
specify a loan repayment that is contingent on the aggregate state of the economy. Here,
in contrast, nominal debt contracts are not contingent on the aggregate state of the
economy and, therefore, banks su¤er balance sheet losses as a result of higher-than-
expected entrepreunerial defaults. Banks are required to nance a minimum fraction of
their assets in terms of equity capital.
4
2.1 Households
Households are innitely lived and maximise lifetime utility as follows,
max
ct,lt,dt
Et
1X
s=0
t+s
"
ln ct+s   ' l
1+
t+s
1 + 
#
, (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor, ct is consumption, lt is labour supply, ' is the
weight on labour disutility and   0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
The household chooses ct, lt and bank deposits dt to maximise utility (1) subject to the
period budget constraint
ct + dt + tt  wtlt + R
D
t dt 1
t
+ Kt , (2)
where tt are lump sum taxes (in terms of the nal consumption good), wt is the real
wage, RDt is the gross interest rate on deposits paid in period t, t = Pt=Pt 1 is the gross
ination rate and Kt are capital producersprots that are redistributed to households.
The households rst order optimality conditions can be simplied to a labour supply
equation and a consumption Euler equation,
wt =
'tl

t
t
, (3)
1 = Et

t;t+1
RDt+1
t+1

, (4)
where t;t+s = 
t+st+s
t
is the households stochastic discount factor and the Lagrange
multiplier on the budget constraint (2), t = 1=ct captures the shadow value of household
wealth in real terms.
2.2 Production
Within the production sector we distinguish nal goods producers, intermediate goods
producers, and capital goods producers. Final goods producers are perfectly competitive.
They create consumption bundles by combining intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz
technology and sell them to the household sector. Intermediate goods producers use
capital and labour to produce the goods used as inputs by the nal goods producers. They
set prices subject to quadratic adjustment costs, which introduces the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in our model. Finally, capital goods producers buy the consumption good
and convert it to capital which they sell to the entrepreneurs.
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Final Goods
A nal goods rm bundles the di¤erentiated industry goods Yit, with i 2 (0; 1), taking as
given their price Pit, and sells the output Yt at the competitive price Pt. The optimisation
problem of the nal goods rm is to choose the amount of inputs that maximise prots,
i.e. it solves:
max
Yit

PtYt  
Z 1
0
YitPitdi

,
subject to the CES production function,
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
it di
 "
" 1
, (5)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between industry goods. From the rst order
condition we derive the demand for industry goods,
Y dit =

Pit
Pt
 "
Yt. (6)
Substituting Yit in the production function using (6) yields the price of nal output, which
we interpret as an aggregate price index,
Pt =
Z 1
0
P 1 "it di
 1
1 "
.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the price of a variety and the price index coincide, Pt = Pit.
Intermediate Goods
Firms use capital and labour to produce wholesale output according to a constant returns
to scale (CRS) production function. BGG (1999) assume that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas. The CRS assumption is important; it allows us to write the produc-
tion function as an aggregate relationship. There is a continuum of intermediate goods
producers indexed by i 2 (0; 1). Each of them produces a di¤erentiated good using
Yit = AtK

itl
1 
it , (7)
where 0 <  < 1 is the capital share in production, At is aggregate technology, Kit are
capital services and lit is labour input. The logarithm of technology follows a stationary
AR(1) process,
lnAt = A lnAt 1 + "
A
t ;
6
where 0 < A < 1 and "
A
t is an iid shock with mean zero and variance 
2
A. Intermediate
goods rms maximise prots,
PitYit
Pt
  rKt Kit   wtlit,
where rKt is the real rental rate on capital and wt is the real wage, subject to the techno-
logical constraint (7) and the demand constraint (6). The demand for capital and labour
is given by
wt = (1  )stYit
lit
, (8)
and
rKt = st
Yit
Kit
, (9)
respectively.
We compute the capital-labour ratio by combining capital demand (9) and labour
demand (8),
Kit
lit
=

1  
wt
rKt
.
Substituting the capital labour ratio in equation (8) yields
st =
w1 t (r
K
t )

(1  )1 
1
At
,
where the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint, st, represents real marginal
costs.
Price Setting
Firms set prices Pit to maximise prots, subject to the demand constraint (6) and to
price adjustment costs PACit, to be dened below. Firm is problem is
max
Pit
Et
1X
s=0
t;t+s

Pit+sY
d
it+s
Pt+s
  PACit+s + st+s
 
Yit+s   Y dit+s

, (10)
Price adjustment costs are proportional to rm revenues,
PACit =
p
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
PitY
d
it
Pt
, (11)
where p > 0 measures the degree of price rigidity. Perfectly exible prices are given
by p ! 0. Price adjustment costs are a function of the ratio of the rms price change
Pit=Pjt 1 to steady-state ination. Under symmetry, all rms produce the same amount
of output, and the rms price Pit equals the aggregate price level Pt, such that the price
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setting condition is
p
t


t

  1

= st" ("  1)
"
1  p
2

t

  1
2#
+pEt

t+1
t
t+1


t+1

  1

Yt+1
Yt

.
(12)
Capital Goods
Perfectly competitive capital producers buy consumption goods at price Pt, convert them
into capital goods and sell those capital goods to entrepreneurs at real price qt. Capital
accumulation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs of the form
k
2

It
Kt
  
2
Kt.
Notice that adjustment costs and their rst derivative are equal to zero in steady state.
The introduction of capital adjustment costs yields a variable price of capital. Capital
goods rms are owned by households. The capital producersproblem has the following
rst order condition,
qt = 1 + k

It
Kt
  

. (13)
The law of motion for capital is
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It+1. (14)
where  is the capital depreciation rate.
2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are indicated by a superscript E, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs
on the unit interval and they are indexed by j 2 (0; 1). They are assumed to live for
two periods (overlapping generations) and they are risk neutral.2 They purchase capital
from the capital production sector and, together with depreciated capital from previous
entrepreneurs, they rent it to the consumption goods producers.
Wealth Allocation
In period 2, entrepreneurs have to decide which fraction of their (real) wealth WEt+1 they
allocate to consumption cEt+1 and which fraction they leave as a bequest n
E
t+1 for the next
generation of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur js preferences with respect to consumption
2We follow Clerc et al (2014) by assuming an overlapping generations structure for entrepreneures
and bankers, rather than a constant survival rate as in BGG (1999). The wealth accumulation equation
looks similar under the two assumptions.
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and bequests are described by the following utility function
max
cEjt+1;n
Ej
t+1
(cEjt+1)
E(nEjt+1)
1 E ,
subject to
cEjt+1 + n
Ej
t+1  WEjt+1:
At the optimum, a constant fraction of an entrepreneurs wealth is allocated to consump-
tion while the remainder is left as bequest,
cEt+1 = 
EWEt+1, (15)
nEt+1 = (1  E)WEt+1: (16)
In period 1, the entrepreneur j is born with an amount nEjt obtained from the previous
generation. Aggregate entrepreneurial wealth in period t+1 is given by the value of their
capital stock bought in the previous period, qtK
j
t , multiplied by the ex-post rate of return
on capital REt+1, multiplied by the fraction of returns which are left to the entrepreneur
1   Et+1, discounted by the gross rate of ination,
WEjt+1 =
 
1   Et+1
 REt+1qtKjt
t+1
. (17)
Note that the discussion of the contracting problem between entrepreneurs and banks
below contains a derivation of  Et+1.
Borrowing
Entrepreneur j chooses the level of capital Kjt+1 which has a real price qt per unit. Cap-
ital is chosen at t and used for production at t + 1. It has an ex post gross return
!Ejt+1R
E
t+1, where R
E
t+1 is the aggregate return on capital and !
Ej
t+1 is an idiosyncratic
(entrepreneur-specic) disturbance, the latter being iid log-normally distributed with
mean Ef!Ejt+1g = 1. The probability of entrepreneurs default is dened by the respective
cumulative distribution function evaluated at !Ejt+1
FEt+1 = F
E(!Ejt+1) =
Z !Ejt+1
0
fE(!Ejt+1)d!
Ej
t+1;
where fE() is the respective probability density function. The entrepreneur has net
worth nEjt , which she carries over into period t + 1, and faces expenditures on capital
goods qtK
j
t . She borrows the remainder,
bjt = qtK
j
t   nEjt , (18)
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from the bank. The entrepreneur receives a loan from the bank which, in turn, obtains
funds from households and bankers. The lender must pay a monitoring cost in order to
observe the entrepreneurs realised return on capital. This cost is a proportion E of
the realised gross payo¤ to the rms, i.e. E!Ejt+1R
E
t+1qtK
j
t and is incurred in the case of
default.
2.4 Financial Contract
The bank enters into a nancial contract with the entrepreneurs. Depending on the
realisation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock, some entrepreneurs will declare default
while others continue operating. A productivity threshold !Ejt+1 is dened such that for
realizations of !Ejt+1 smaller than the threshold the entrepreneur is able to repay her loan
in full, i.e. the entrepreneur declares default, while for values greater than the treshold
the entrepreneur will honour her contractual obligation by paying the bank ZEjt b
j
t , i.e.
!Ejt+1R
E
t+1qtK
j
t = Z
Ej
t b
j
t , (19)
where ZEjt is the contractual repayment rate. We rewrite the above condition as follows,
!Ejt+1 =
xEjt
REt+1
,
where we dene the entrepreneurs leverage as xEjt  ZEjt bjt=(qtKjt+1). Unlike BGG (1999),
the cuto¤ productivity level !Ejt+1 is not contingent on the realisation of the aggregate
state REt+1but on its expected value.
3 This assumption is important since it introduces
the possibility of rm defaults impinging on bank balance sheets in the model.
The entrepreneur is risk-neutral and cares only about the mean return on his wealth.
However, the bank bears some of the losses stemming from aggregate risk, as in Zhang
(2009), Benes and Kumhof (2011) and Clerc et al (2014). The expected real return to
the entrepreneur is given by the expected project return net of loan repayments which
realise if the entrepreneur does not default,
Et
Z 1
!Ejt+1
!Ejt+1R
E
t+1qtK
j
t f
E(!Ejt+1)d!
Ej
t+1   [1  FE(!Ejt+1)]ZEjt bjt , (20)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variable REt+1. As noted above,
the random variable !Ejt+1 follows a log-normal distribution with mean one and a standard
3If instead the cuto¤ productivity level !Ejt+1 is made contingent on the aggregate state given by R
E
t+1
as in BGG (1999), the entrepreneur bears all the aggregate risk, and the bank is perfectly insulated from
any losses stemming from defaulting entrepreneurs.
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deviation Et = 
E& t, which introduces time variability of rm risk via an AR(1) process,
ln & t = & ln & t 1 + "
&
t ,
such that 0 < & < 1 and 
& denotes the standard deviation of the iid normal shock "&t .
In the case where !Ejt+1 < !
Ej
t+1, the entrepreneur is not able to fully repay her loan.
In this case, the entrepreneur has to pay the whole return !Ejt+1R
E
t+1qtK
j
t to the bank.
In the non-default case the bank receives only the contractural agreement !Ejt+1R
E
t+1qtK
j
t .
The remainder, (!Ejt+1   !Ejt+1)REt+1qtKjt , is left for the residual claimant, the entrepre-
neur. Consequently, if the entrepreneur does not default, the payment is independent of
the realisation of the random variable but depends solely on the threshold value. The
di¤erence to BGG (1999) is that the threshold productivity is outside the expectations
operator, as shown in Zhang (2009). Substituting out ZEjt b
j
t in (20) using (19), and using
our assumption that Et(!Ejt+1) = 1, allows us to rewrite the expression for the expected
real return as  
1   Et+1

REt+1qtK
j
t , (21)
where we dene
 Et+1 =  
E(!Ejt+1) 
Z !Ejt+1
0
!Ejt+1f(!
Ej
t+1)d!
Ej
t+1 + [1  FE(!Ejt+1)]!Ejt+1,
such that 1    Et+1 represents the share of the return which is left for the entrepreneur.
Equation (21) represents entrepreneur js expected prots which she seeks to maximise
when negotiating the credit contract with the bank.
In order for the bank to agree on the contract, the return which the bank earns from
lending funds to the entrepreneur (left hand side) must be equal to or greater than the
return the bank would obtain from investing its equity in the interbank market (right
hand side),
Etf
 
1   Ft+1

[(1 FEt+1)!Ejt+1+(1 E)
Z !Ejt+1
0
!Ejt+1f
E(!Ejt+1)d!
Ej
t+1]R
E
t+1qtK
j
t g  EtfRBt+1nBt g,
(22)
where
 Ft+1 =
RDt+1dt
RFt+1bt
,
and 1  Ft+1 is thus the share of loan return to the banker after the bank has made interest
payments to the depositors. Banks nance loans using equity and deposits. They are
subject to the following capital constraint,
nBt  tbt, (23)
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which says that equity must be at least a fraction t of bank assets. As t rises, banks
hold more internal equity; as t falls, the fraction of external funds increases. It can be
shown that (23) holds with equality in equilibrium such that nBt = tbt. Aggregating
capital holdings and net worth over each group of entrepreneurs, we dene Kt =
R
j
Kjt dj
and nEt =
R
j
nEjt dj, such that
bt = qtKt   nEt (24)
are the total loans that the bank provides to entrepreneurs. Replacing bt in (23), we
obtain nBt = t(qt
R
j
Kjt dj   nEt ) and the banks participation constraint (22) becomes
Etf
 
1   Ft+1

( Et+1   EGEt+1)REt+1qtKjt g  tEtfRBt+1(qt
Z
j
Kjt dj   nEt )g, (25)
where we dene the share of returns subject to rm default as follows,
GEt+1 = G
E(!Ejt+1) 
Z !Ejt+1
0
!Ejt+1f
E(!Ejt+1)d!
Ej
t+1.
Using the above results we are able to derive the nancial contract. The entrepreneurs
objective is given by
max
xEjt ;K
j
t+1
Et
("
1   E
 
xEjt
REt+1
!#
REt+1qtK
j
t
)
, (26)
subject to the banks participation constraint,
Et
 
1   Ft+1
 "
 E
 
xEjt
REt+1
!
  EGE
 
xEjt
REt+1
!#
REt+1qtK
j
t = tEtfRBt+1(qt
Z
j
Kjt dj   nEt )g.
(27)
The optimality conditions of the contracting problem are
Etf  E0t+1 + Ejt
 
1   Ft+1
  
 E0t+1   EGE0t+1
g = 0,
Etf
 
1   Et+1

REt+1 + 
Ej
t
 
1   Ft+1
  
 Et+1   EGEt+1

REt+1   tRBt+1
g = 0,
where Ejt is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the bank participation constraint
(27).
2.5 Bankers
Banks obtain equity from bankers who face a trade-o¤ between consuming and leaving a
bequest for following generations. Each banker lives for two periods. In period 2, bankers
have to decide which fraction of their real wealthWBt+1 they allocate to consumption cBt+1
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and which fraction they want to invest as bank equity nBt+1 which yields a return R
B
t+1.
Their preferences with respect to consumption and bequests are described by the following
utility function:
max
cBt+1;n
B
t+1
(cBt+1)
B
 
nBt+1
1 B
,
subject to
cBt+1 + n
B
t+1  WBt+1.
Analogous to the wealth allocation problem of entrepreneurs, the optimality conditions
of bankers with respect to consumption and bequests are, respectively,
cBt+1 = 
BWBt+1, (28)
nBt+1 = (1  B)WBt+1. (29)
In period 1, the banker is born with real net worth nBt which she inherits from the previous
generation. The only investment opportunity of the banker is to provide equity to the
bank. Bankers obtain an ex post aggregate return of RBt+1 on their investment, which
determines their wealth in period 2,
WBt+1 =
RBt+1n
B
t
t+1
. (30)
2.6 Banks
The bank obtains deposits from households and raises equity from bankers. Its assets are
the loans which it provides to the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the banks balance sheet
reads
nBt + dt = bt. (31)
Bank prots in period t + 1 are the di¤erence between the return from loans to the
entrepreneurs and the interest payments on household deposits,
Ft+1 = R
F
t+1bt  RDt+1dt. (32)
where RFt+1 is the banks realised return on loans to entrepreneurs.
4
4We verify numerically that bank prots are non-negative in all states and at all dates.
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2.7 Realised Rates of Return
The ex-post gross rate of return on a bankers equity RBt+1 is given by the ratio of bank
prots to banker net worth, Ft+1=n
B
t , or using (32),
RBt+1 =
RFt+1bt  RDt+1dt
nBt
=
 
1   Ft+1

RFt+1bt
nBt
. (33)
In turn, the return on bank loans in (36), RFt+1, is derived as the payo¤ to the bank on
loans in t+1, which is given by
 
 Et+1   EGEt+1

REt+1qtKt, divided by the volume of loans
bt. That is,
RFt+1 = 
E
t+1
REt+1qtKt
bt
. (34)
where Et+1 =  
E
t+1   EGEt+1. The nominal gross return to entrepreneurs of holding a
unit of capital from t to t+ 1 is given by the rental rate on capital, plus the capital gain
net of depreciation, (1  ) qt+1, divided by the real price of capital, in period t,
REt+1 =
rKt+1 + (1  ) qt+1
qt
t+1. (35)
It is useful to derive the real return on equity as a function of the policy instruments RDt
and t. Combining the return on equity (33) with the loan return (34), we have
RBt+1 = 
E
t+1R
E
t+1qtKt  RDt+1
dt
nBt
, (36)
Using the denition of the capital ratio (23) to replace dt=nBt and the return on capital
(35) to replace REt+1, and dividing by ination t+1, this becomes
RBt+1
t+1
= Et+1

rKt+1 + (1  ) qt+1

Kt   R
D
t+1
t+1
1
t
. (37)
Two things can be observed from (37). First, the e¤ective real equity return is a positive
function of the capital requirement t, ceteris paribus. When the bank is required to
nance a larger fraction of loans using equity, this raises the real return on equity earned
by bankers. Second, the e¤ective real equity return is a negative function of the e¤ective
real interest rate RDt+1=t+1. The higher the rate of return that the bank has to pay
depositors, the lower is the banks prot and therefore the lower is the return accruing
to equity holders.
2.8 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Consumption goods produced must equal goods demanded by households, entrepreneurs
and bankers; goods used for investment, resources lost when adjusting investment, and
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resources lost in the recovery of funds associated with entrepreneur defaults,
Yt = ct + 
EWEt+1 + BWBt+1 +
k
2

It
Kt
  
2
Kt + 
EGEt
REt qt 1Kt
t
.
Firmslabour demand must equal labour supply.
(1  ) stYt
lt
=
'tl

t
t
.
The model is closed with a monetary policy rule that governs the policy rate Rt and
a macroprudential rule that governs the capital ratio, t. Notice that because of full
deposit insurance, the policy rate is identical to the risk-free deposit rate, Rt = RDt .
We are now ready to provide a formal denition of equilibrium in our economy.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a set of allocations flt, Kt, It, ct, Yt, nEt , bt, nBt , dt,
xEt g1t=0, prices fwt, rKt , qt, t, stg1t=0 and rates of return fREt , RFt , RBt g1t=0 which, given
the monetary and macroprudential policies fRt, tg1t=0 and shocks to technology and rm
risk fAt, & tg1t=0 satisfy the set of equations summarised in Table 1.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
We derive the deterministic zero-ination steady state. To this end, we rst set gross
ination and technology to unity in steady state as a normalisation,  = A = 1. Second,
we solve numerically for labour l, rm leverage xE, the share of the loan return going
to depositors  F ; and the return on capital, RE. Given initial values for those steady
state parameters, we can solve for the remaining steady state variables recursively. The
recursive steady state equations are provided in Table 2.
2.9 Calibration and Steady State
We calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency. The calibration of our model parameters
is summarised in Table 3. Most of the structural parameters have standard values. The
subjective discount factor  is set to 0:99, implying a quarterly risk-free (gross) interest
rate of 1:01 or a real annual (net) interest rate of roughly 4%, given that steady state
gross ination is set to unity,  = 1. The inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply is set
to  = 0:2, which is common for macroeconomic models. The capital share in production
is set to  = 0:3, the substitution elasticity between goods varieties is " = 6, implying
a gross steady state markup of "=("   1) = 1:2. The Rotemberg price adjustment cost
parameter is p = 20. Capital depreciation in steady state is  = 0:025 per quarter, while
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the capital adjustment cost parameter is set to k = 2.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
We now turn to the nancial parameters. The share of wealth that is consumed by
the old generation is set to 6% for both entrepreneurs and bankers, i.e. E = B =
0:06. Monitoring costs are the fraction of the return that is lost when a debtor declares
default. This parameter is set to E = 0:3. The size of the idiosyncratic shock hitting
entrepreneurs is E = 0:12. The steady state capital requirement for banks, i.e. the ratio
of equity to loans, is set to 8%, that is  = 0:08.
The implied steady state values of several model variables are shown in Table 2 below.
We rst discuss the ranking of the various interest rates and spreads in steady state, before
turning to the default probability of entrepreneurs.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
The risk-free rate corresponds to the deposit rate RD and to the policy rate R in steady
state. The realised return on loans to entrepreneurs is RF = 1:0144. This return contains
a discount which is related to the monitoring cost E that the bank must incur when an
entrepreneur declares default. The next higher rate of return is the return on capital,
RE = 1:0284. The return on capital is yet higher than the realised loan return RF ,
because it needs to compensate the entrepreneur for running the risk of default while it is
not reduced by the monitoring cost. Finally, the return on equity earned by bankers RB
exceeds the realised loan return, because it contains a compensation to bankers (or equity
holders) for the risk of bank default. In addition, the loan return is a decreasing function
of the capital requirement t; the higher is the capital requirement, the more equity banks
will hold, and hence the lower is the implied return on equity, RB. Table 2 also shows the
annualised return spreads on bank loans (1:7%), on entrepreneurial capital (7:3%) and
on equity (21:5%). The quarterly default probability of entrepreneurs is 0:66%, which
corresponds to an annual default rate of 2:6%.
In our welfare analysis below, we simulate the model under autoregressive processes
for the technology shock, lnAt, and the rm risk shock, ln & t. Both shocks are assumed
to have persistence 0:9. The size of the technology shock is set to 0:0046 and the size of
the rm risk shock is set to 0:07 following Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014).
3 Macroprudential and Monetary Policy
We now analyse the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy in the form
of simple rules. We follow the approach in Kumhof, Nunes and Yakadina (2010), who
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focus on simple monetary rules under scal dominance. Kumhof et al (2010) dene scal
dominance as a situation where scal policy is unable or unwilling to adjust primary
surpluses to stabilize government debt. In the standard New Keynesian model, lump
sum taxes are used to satisfy the government budget constraint, and hence scal policy is
passive in the sense that it reacts at most weakly to government debt. Then, an aggressive
monetary policy reaction to ination, i.e. an adherence to the Taylor Principle, is required
for determinacy.
In our model, we dene macroprudential policy as being either active or passive in a
way analogous to Leeper (1991). We refer to nancial dominanceas a situation where
macroprudential policy is unable or unwilling to adjust its instrument - the bank capital
ratio - su¢ ciently in response to private sector debt.5 This is the case when the coe¢ cient
in the macroprudential rule, b is too low and macroprudential policy is therefore active.
Our result mirrors that in Kumhof et al (2010): in the absence of nancial dominance the
Taylor Principle is re-established. For this to happen, the macroprudential instrument
must respond su¢ ciently to lending such that macroprudential policy becomes passive.
However, if bank capital ratios imposed by the macroprudential regulator are constant
or respond too little to credit, an aggressive monetary policy stance can lead to indeter-
minacy.
We proceed as follows. We rst analyse the determinacy properties of the model,
i.e. the conditions under which a unique stable equilibrium solution to the model exists.
Second, we take into account the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint by comparing the
standard deviation of the interest rate under various combinations of the policy coe¢ -
cients with its steady state level. Parameter combinations that imply a violation of the
ZLB constraint more than 5% of the time are discarded. Finally, we compute the im-
plied volatility of ination and bank lending for all parameter combinations that produce
a unique equilibrium and perform a welfare analysis which provides information about
preferred values of policy coe¢ cients in which the ZLB is not violated too often.
3.1 Interest Rate Rule and Capital Requirement Rule
We consider a monetary policy rule by which the central bank may adjust the policy rate
in response to ination and lending. The respective feedback coe¢ cients are  and  b,
such that:
Rt
R
=

t

 bt
b
b
. (38)
The response of the interest rate to lending, the second term in the monetary policy rule
(38), has been called "Leaning Against The Wind" (LATW) in the literature.6 Similar
5Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) dene nancial dominance more generally as the inability or
unwillingness of the nancial sector to absorb losses.
6LATW may also refer to an augmented monetary policy rule where the interest rate responds to
assets prices, see e.g. Cecchetti et al (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001). We do not consider this
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specications can be found in many papers, for instance in Benes and Kumhof (2011)
or in Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2013). The idea behind a positive coe¢ cient
on borrowing,  b > 0, is that monetary policy may want to dampen nancial cycles by
varying the interest rate, even if ination is subdued.
Macroprudential policy is given by a rule for how the bank capital requirement should
be set in response to changes in lending,
t

=

bt
b
b
. (39)
The capital requirement rule in (39) has been used in this form in other studies, e.g. in
Benes and Kumhof (2011) and in Clerc et al (2014). It is a natural specication that
lets the policy instrument (the capital ratio) react to deviations of the debt level from
its steady state value with a coe¢ cient b. Fiscal policy rules are often specied in a
similar way: the scal instrument, e.g. the tax rate, responds with a certain coe¢ cient to
deviations of the public debt level from its steady state (or target) level, see e.g. Kumhof
et al (2010).
The parametrizations of the policy rules is the focus of our analysis below.
3.2 Determinacy Analysis
We characterise the determinacy region for two cases. First, we consider two separate
rules for monetary and macroprudential policy in our benchmark model. Second, we use
a model variant with a constant bank capital requirement and a reaction in the interest
rate rule to lending.
Macroprudential Stabilisation
We analyse determinacy for di¤erent combinations of the coe¢ cient on ination in the
interest rate rule and the coe¢ cient on lending in the bank capital rule. By setting the
coe¢ cient on lending in the interest rate rule ( b) to zero, we consider a variant of the
so-called Taylor Rule, see Taylor (1993),
 6= 0,  b = 0, b 6= 0.
The result of this exercise is depicted in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the coe¢ cient
in the macroprudential rule (b), varying between 0 and 25, while the vertical axis shows
the coe¢ cient on ination in the Taylor Rule (), varying between  1 and 3. Even
though we do not consider a negative ination coe¢ cient as economically meaningful, we
type of rule here.
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do not want to impose any priors at this point of the analysis. See also the exercise in
Kumhof et al (2010).
Result 1: Under a macroprudential policy rule which sets a bank capital requirement
in response to the volume of lending, there is a threshold coe¢ cient b below which the
Taylor Principle is violated.
We notice that the gure is divided into quadrants, two of which correspond to para-
meter regions with a unique solution (determinacy regions): the lower left and upper right
quadrants. This means that the model is determinate if the coe¢ cient on ination in the
interest rate rule and the coe¢ cient on borrowing in the macroprudential rule are either
both low or both high. In other words, both policies have to be similarly accommodating
or aggressive.
[ insert Figures 2 and 3 here ]
What is the intuition for this result? If macroprudential policy is active, such that b is
(too) low, banks do not raise capital holdings adequately in response to rises in debt: the
economy su¤ers from nancial dominance.
In the upper left quadrant, monetary policy follows the Taylor Principle - as it should
in the New Keynesian model without nancial frictions. The coe¢ cient on ination in the
interest rate rule is greater than unity,  > 1. The resulting Fisher debt-deation e¤ect
increases the real value of outstanding debt. As a result, debt becomes unsustainable and
the model features an explosive solution.
Determinacy is instead achieved in the lower left quadrant. The ine¤ectiveness of
macroprudential regulation in stabilising borrowing forces the monetary authority to take
on a more accommodative stance than in the absence of nancial stability concerns. More
precisely, the central bank must move the interest rate less than one-for-one in response to
ination in order to attain a determinate equilibrium. By violating the Taylor Principle,
monetary policy allows nancial stability concerns to override its price stability objective.
If the macroprudential rule features a strong response of the capital requirement to
borrowing, i.e. a high b, determinacy requires that the Taylor Principle be satised, such
that  > 1, see the upper right quadrant in Figure 2. In that case, the debt-deation
e¤ect which jeopardises nancial stability in a downturn is su¢ ciently compensated for
by increases in the bank capital ratio, such that debt does not spiral out of control and
the system displays a unique solution. Finally, in the lower right quadrant, the capital
requirement ratio is strongly procyclical with respect to borrowing, but monetary policy
is passive in the sense that it does not move the interest rate by more than the change
in ination. The result of this parameter constellation is indeterminacy.
Indeterminacy opens up the possibility of sunspot equilibria. Suppose that entrepre-
neurs expect a high future return on their investment. They want to invest more and
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raise their demand for capital. Given their net worth, this implies that they need to
borrow more from banks. In the lower right quadrant of Figure 2, the macroprudential
rule (39) requires the bank capital ratio to be raised strongly along with borrowing (b
is high). Therefore, an investment boom triggers a rise in bank capital t, which by
equation (37) boosts the real return on equity, RBt+1=t+1. The rates of return on equity
and on entrepreneurial capital are related, see (36). Thus, the return on risky investment
rises and the entrepreneursexpectation becomes a self-fullling prophecy.
Leaning Against the Wind
In a second model variant, we assume an augmented monetary policy rule, according to
which the interest rate reacts to ination and borrowing, coupled with a constant capital
requirement. In particular, the policy rule coe¢ cients are given by
 6= 0,  b 6= 0, b = 0. (40)
We proceed in the same way as above and analyse determinacy and the transmission
mechanism in this variant of the model. We let the ination coe¢ cient  range from
 1 to 3 as above, and we let the leaning against the windcoe¢ cent  b range from  0:5
to 1.
Result 2: Under a leaning against the windpolicy with a constant capital require-
ment and an interest rate rule that reacts to ination and lending, the Taylor Principle
is violated for plausible values of policy rule coe¢ cient on lending,  b.
Figure 3 displays the determinacy regions corresponding to the augmented Taylor
Rule model. We notice that on the entire support of  b, determinacy is achieved when
the Taylor Principle is violated. The central bank is therefore forced to take on an
accommodative stance in order to select a unique equilibrium. This result is due to the
fact that there is no instrument that e¤ectively stabilises lending bt. Therefore, the Fisher
debt-deation channel, which is active under the Taylor Principle, leads to a snowballing
of debt and thus explosive dynamics.
The above analysis has shown that the absence of a separate macroprudential instru-
ment necessitates a passive monetary policy rule. Put di¤erently, an active monetary
policy rule, i.e. one that satises the Taylor Principle, can only be combined with a
separate macroprudential instrument, which is e¤ective in stabilising lending. Such an
active monetary policy cannot be combined with a policy of leaning against the wind
by raising interest rates in response to changes in lending volumes.
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3.3 Discussion and Sensitivity Analysis
To better understand the main result presented in the previous section, we derive the
dynamic equation which is crucial in the determination of the equilibrium dynamics: the
bankers net worth equation. We combine banker bequests (29) and banker wealth (30)
to obtain,
nBt+1 = (1  B)

RBt+1
t+1

nBt . (41)
The stability of this process depends on the properties of the terms in front of nBt . First,
it depends on the degree of altruism of the bankers, 1  B, i.e. on the fraction of their
wealth that they leave as bequests to the next generation. Second, it depends on the real
e¤ective return on equity, RBt+1=t+1. The latter, derived in (37), is repeated here for
convenience,
RBt+1
t+1
= Et+1

rKt+1 + (1  ) qt+1

Kt   R
D
t+1
t+1
1
t
. (42)
This relation makes it clear that stability of the bankers net worth depends positively
on macroprudential policy, which a¤ects the capital requirement, t, and negatively on
monetary policy, which a¤ects the e¤ective real interest rate, RDt+1=t+1. In particular,
we can combine the real equity return (42) with the monetary policy rule (38) and the
macroprudential rule (39), to nd
RBt+1
t+1
= Et+1

rKt+1 + (1  ) qt+1

Kt   1


t+1

 1bt+1
b
b b
. (43)
Equation (43) shows that, ceteris paribus, the real equity return RBt+1=t+1 is increasing
in the macroprudential policy coe¢ cient b and decreasing in the ination coe¢ cient 
and in the leaning-against-the-wind coe¢ cient  b.
The determinacy analysis of the previous section relied on a particular calibration of
the model parameters. We now investigate the sensitivity of our results to perturbations
in selected parameter values. In particular, the bankers net worth equation (41) and
the real e¤ective equity return (43) suggest that the following parameters are crucial in
determining the stability of nBt : the steady state bank capital requirement , the bankers
propensity to consume B, and steady state rm risk E.
First, let us consider the steady state bank capital requirement . We make macro-
prudential policy more stringent by raising  from 0:08 to 0:1 and carrying out the same
determinacy analysis as above. The result of this exercise is shown in Figure 5. We
can see from the gure that the threshold value b below which the Taylor Principle is
violated shifts to the left. As a result, the determinacy region associated with nancial
dominance, the lower left quadrant, shrinks.
[ insert Figures 4 and 5 here ]
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The intuition for this nding is that the real equity return is positively related to both the
bank capital requirement  and the macroprudential coe¢ cient b. To keep the equity
return stable, a higher capital requirement therefore allows for a lower response coe¢ cient
on lending in the macroprudential rule. Note that we do not consider a steady state capital
requirement of zero,  = 0. The reasons for this are threefold. The rst reason is that the
regulatory requirement as specied in the Basel Agreements stipulates a (constant) capital
ratio of 8%.7 The case of  = 0 therefore does not appear empirically relevant. The second
reason is that the bank has no incentive to hold capital in this model, because capital is
the more expensive form of nancing loans relative to deposit funding. Therefore, without
a positive steady state capital requirement, the macroprudential authority would not be
able to use the capital ratio in a symmetric manner, raising t when debt levels are high
and lowering t when they are low, because the capital ratio cannot go negative. Finally,
Clerc et al (2014) show - in a more elaborate model with household and bank defaults,
and less than perfect deposit insurance - that the welfare-optimising steady state capital
ratio is positive.
Second, we alter the bankers propensity to consume, B. Recall that this parameter
captures the fraction of wealth that is consumed by the old generation of bankers, while
the remainder is left as a bequest to the young generation. We can make bankers more
selsh (less altruistic) by raising B. Again, the threshold value b shifts to the left
(not shown). The reason is that more selsh bankers consume more of their wealth each
period, such that their wealth accumulates more slowly.
Finally, we increase the size of the rm-risk shock, E, from 0:12 to 0:24. This doubling
of steady state rm risk lowers the expected share of the return on the entrepreneurs
investment that accrues to the bank, Et+1. Therefore, the real equity return R
B
t+1=t+1
increases by less and the net worth of bankers becomes more stable. As in the above
exercise, the threshold b moves to the left and the explosive region becomes smaller.
The corresponding gure resembles Figure 5 and is not shown here.
3.4 E¤ect of the Zero Lower Bound
Considering di¤erent monetary policy regimes raises the question whether the proposed
parameter choices are attainable. In this respect monetary policy faces a minimum con-
straint on its policy instrument which limits its ability to appropriately react to ination.
In order to take the zero lower bound into consideration, we follow the approach of
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Among all policy combinations which yield a unique
and stable solution, we rule out those which violate our zero lower bound condition. In
particular, in order for the interest rate not to hit the zero lower bound we require that
7At the time of writing, countercyclical capital bu¤ers are being developed but are operational only
in a small number of countries.
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twice the standard deviation of the policy instrument is no greater than the logarithm of
the steady state gross policy interest rate,
2R  ln(R),
where R and R denote, respectively, the steady state and the standard deviation of the
policy rate. Assuming a normally distributed random variable, this condition places a
corridor around the steady state which contains the actual interest rate with probability
0.95. If this interval does not contain zero, central banks risk of hitting the lower bound is
assumed to be su¢ ciently small. If the policy instrument is volatile, a binding constraint
becomes more likely, given a steady state value R = 1=.
[ insert Figures 6 and 7 here ]
In Figure 6 we depict in blue the regions attainable given certain combinations of the
macroprudential and monetary policy rule coe¢ cients. The white regions correspond to
situations where either no unique and stable equilibrium is obtained or where the zero
lower bound is violated. The upper right region is not a¤ected by the zero lower bound,
while the lower left region features cases which are not attainable since the risk of hitting
the bound becomes relevant.
Figure 7 repeats the exercise for the "Leaning-against-the-wind"-case. Notice that
the zero lower bound shrinks the determinacy region in the model variant with LATW.
The highest ination coe¢ cient required for a unique and stable equilibrium is reduced
and appears to fall as we increase the coe¢ cient on borrowing in the bank capital rule.
This exacerbates the violation of the Taylor Principle.
4 Optimal Simple Policy Rules
Our results show that the specic choice of policy rule parameter values is critical for the
existence of a unique bounded solution. Now, the question arises which of the remaining
parameter combinations delivers the best outcomein our model economy. In order to
answer this question, we perform a welfare analysis of how di¤erent coe¢ cients in our
monetary and macroprudential policy rules a¤ect household welfare when the economy
is subject to two types of shocks: technology shocks and rm risk shocks.
We rst discuss the derivation of the welfare measure we use to evaluate the deter-
minate model equilibria. We employ the method developed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007) and therefore follow their exposition closely. Let us dene the reference policy as
a combination of the policy parameters in the monetary and the macroprudential policy
rule. This policy is associated with a particular conditional lifetime utility level as of
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period zero, V r0 , which represents reference policy welfare in our model economy,
V r0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ln crt   '
(lrt )
1+
1 + 
#
:
We dene the reference policy as the one that delivers the maximum lifetime utility
within the space of policy parameters considered. Similarly, we dene utility associated
with alternative policy rule parameters being of the same functional form,
V a0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ln cat   '
(lat )
1+
1 + 
#
:
In general, an alternative policy regime is not optimal in terms of utility. Given an optimal
reference policy, i.e. V r0  V a0 , it is possible to reduce the amount of reference consumption
by a fraction  such that we obtain the same utility level as for the alternative policy.
More technically, there exists a  such that
V a0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
(
ln [(1  ) crt ]  '
(lrt )
1+
1 + 
)
:
We can rewrite the above expression in terms of the reference policy utility level V r0 ,
V a0 =
ln(1  )
1   + V
r
0 :
Solving this expression for , we obtain
 = 1  exp [(1  )(V a0   V r0 )] :
The resulting expression represents the percentage welfare loss relative to the economy
operating under a policy rule with optimised coe¢ cients. Note that higher values of 
coincide with less preferable equilibria.
As above, we consider two policy regimes, macroprudential stabilisationand leaning
against the wind. In the rst regime, monetary policy (with its instrument being the
interest rate) reacts to ination and macroprudential policy (with its instrument being
the capital requirement) reacts to lending. In the second regime, the capital requirement
is xed and monetary policy reacts to both ination and lending. We carry out a grid
search over policy coe¢ cients, compute welfare V a0 for each point on the grid and select
the combination of values yielding the highest welfare level, which we call V r0 . We limit
the welfare analysis to regions in the parameter space which deliver a unique and bounded
solution and plot indi¤erence curves in order to characterise the welfare surface in the
determinacy regions. By comparing the welfare levels under the two regimes, we can
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state which of the two is preferable.
Denition 2 The optimal macroprudential stabilisation policy is characterised by
 b = 0 and a pair of policy coe¢ cients  and b in the policy rules (38) and (39), which
maximise welfare in the economy described by the equilibrium conditions summarised in
Table 1.
Figure 8 shows the welfare loss, relative to the optimised rule, associated with di¤erent
pairs of policy coe¢ cients  and b, where  2 [ 1; 3] and b 2 [0; 25]. More precisely,
we are plotting the welfare loss in percentage terms, i.e. 100.
[ insert Figures 8 and 9 here ]
The gure shows that a combination of an active macroprudential policy and a passive
monetary policy rule, i.e. one that violates the Taylor Principle, is not optimal. The
lower left quadrant in the gure, which is associated with low values of both  and b
result in lower welfare than combinations of coe¢ cients in the upper right quadrant. The
optimal policy coe¢ cients are shown as the blue area in the corner of the upper right
quadrant; they represent a corner solution where the macroprudential rule coe¢ cient b,
is at its highest admissible value, and the ination coe¢ cient in the interest rate rule,
, approaches 1 from above.
Denition 3 The optimal leaning against the wind (LATW) policy is given by
b = 0 and a pair of policy coe¢ cients  and  b in the policy rule (38), which maximise
welfare in the economy described by the equilibrium conditions summarised in Table 1.
Figure 9 shows the percentage welfare loss relative to the optimised rule, 100, as-
sociated with di¤erent pairs of policy coe¢ cients  and  b, where  2 [ 1; 3] and
 b 2 [ 0:5; 1]. As the gure shows, a higher value of  b, i.e. stronger leaning against the
wind in the monetary policy rule, leads to ever larger welfare losses. Notice that we can
compute welfare only for parameter combinations resulting in a unique model solution,
which is the case for low values of  that violate the Taylor Principle. We nd that the
optimal coe¢ cient on ination is below unity, while the optimal coe¢ cient on borrowing
is slightly negative. This nding clearly indicates that leaning against the wind, in the
form of a positive coe¢ cient on borrowing in an augmented Taylor rule, is a suboptimal
policy.
In a model with credit frictions, Lambertini et al (2013) report that leaning against
the wind is welfare-improving relative to a standard monetary policy rule. Their model
is however, very di¤erent from ours: credit ows takes place between borrowing and
lending households; demand for credit arises from housing demand; the macroprudential
instrument is a loan-to-value ratio. Instead, our nding is consistent with the point
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made by Svensson (2013), who argues that leaning against the wind can have perverse
e¤ects by increasing rather than decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio. The intuition is that
LATW decreases GDP more than debt, such that the debt ratio ultimately rises. Here,
an accommodative monetary policy ( < 1) coupled with a negative (but small) interest
rate coe¢ cient on borrowing ( b < 0) characterises the optimal simple rule.
5 Conclusion
Financial dominance prevails when macroprudential policy is ine¤ective in stabilising
lending and the nancial sector is not willing - or required by macroprudential policy
- to absorb losses adequately. As a result, monetary policy is forced to be passive: a
violation of the Taylor Principle is necessary to guarantee a unique stable equilibrium.
In other words, monetary policy has to allow for higher ination which improves rms
balance sheet conditions. Equilibrium determinacy is achieved when the monetary and
macroprudential policies are either similarly accommodating or similarly aggressive.
The rst possibility is the adoption of a passive (in the sense of Leeper, 1991) macro-
prudential rule, which means that the banks required capital ratio is increased su¢ ciently
in response to an expansion in corporate lending. Such a policy has a stabilising e¤ect and
re-establishes the Taylor Principle, such that the central bank can focus on its primary
objective, which is to safeguard price stability.
Second, an active macroprudential and a passive monetary policy yield equilibrium
stability. In this case, the capital ratio is kept rather stable, while the interest rate is
raised less than one-for-one in response to changes in ination. E¤ectively, the monetary
authority allows ination to rise in order to reduce the real value of private sector debt.
By assuming some responsibility for nancial stability when the macroprudential policy
is ine¤ective, the central bank goes beyond its price stability mandate. Our analysis
shows, however, that this policy mix leads to lower household welfare. In addition, in
this region of the parameter space, some combinations of policy coe¢ cients are regarded
as not implementable since they increase by too much the probability of hitting the zero
lower bound.
Finally, an alternative solution is to maintain a constant bank capital requirement
whilst following an augmented Taylor-type rule where the interest rate responds not only
to ination but also to bank lending. Under such a policy of leaning against the wind,
equilibrium determinacy requires violating the Taylor Principle: a stable model solution
exists only if the coe¢ cient on ination is set to a value below unity. Furthermore, leaning
against the wind is shown to be clearly suboptimal relative to an active monetary policy
rule combined with a capital requirement rule that responds strongly to lending. The
latter result is consistent with the Tinbergen Principle according to which each individual
policy target requires a separate instrument.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Model
Note: The ows between the agents in our economy are indicated with solid arrows, while the
transmission channels of macroprudential and monetary policy are shown with dashed arrows. The
two policy makers are shown as the shaded boxes, while ovals indicate consuming agents (households,
entrepreneurs and bankers).
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Figure 2: Determinacy Analysis: Macroprudential Stabilisation
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Figure 3: Determinacy Analysis: Leaning Against the Wind
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Note: These gures show the models determinacy properties as a function of the respective response
coe¢ cients on ination and borrowing. The upper gure shows the results in the benchmark model
with an interest rate rule and a macroprudential rule. The lower gure shows the results in the
model variant with an augmented interest rate rule and a constant bank capital requirement.
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Figure 4: Determinacy Analysis: Benchmark Capital Requirement
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Figure 5: Determinacy Analysis: Higher Bank Capital Requirement
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Note: These gures show the determinacy properties of the benchmark model with an interest rate
rule and a macroprudential rule, as a function of the respective response coe¢ cients on ination and
borrowing. The upper gure shows the results for the benchmark calibration where  = 0:08. The
lower gure shows the results for a higher steady state capital requirement,  = 0:1.
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Figure 6: E¤ect of the Zero Lower Bound: Macroprudential Stabilisation
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Figure 7: E¤ect of the Zero Lower Bound: Leaning against the Wind
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Note: These gures show the models determinacy properties as a function of the respective response
coe¢ cients on ination and borrowing. The upper gure shows the results in the benchmark model
with an interest rate rule and a macroprudential rule; the e¤ect of the ZLB is noticeable as a white
area in the bottom left quadrant. The lower gure shows the results in the model variant with an
augmented interest rate rule and a constant bank capital requirement. Here, the ZLB reduces by a
large amount determinacy region in the model, exacerbating the violation of the Taylor Principle.
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Figure 8: Welfare Analysis: Macroprudential Stabilisation
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Figure 9: Welfare Analysis: Leaning against the Wind
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Note: These gures show the welfare loss relative to the optimised policy rule, 100, as a function
of the respective response coe¢ cients on ination and borrowing. The upper gure shows the results
in the benchmark model with an interest rate rule and a macroprudential rule. The lower gure
shows the results in the model variant with an augmented interest rate rule and a constant bank
capital requirement.
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Table 1: Summary of Model Equations
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The system consists of 26 endogenous variables, lt, Kt, It, ct, Yt, nEt , bt, n
B
t , dt, x
E
t , wt, r
K
t , qt, t, st, R
E
t ,
RFt , R
B
t , !
E
t , G
E
t , F
E
t ,  
E
t , G
E0
t , F
E0
t ,  
E0
t ,  
F
t , two policy variables, Rt, t, and two exogenous processes, At,
&t. As can be seen from the table, Kt, qt, nBt , bt, t and x
E
t are endogenous state variables. The functions
() and 0() denote, respectively, the cumulative distribution function and the probability density function
of the standard normal distribution.
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Table 2: Computation of Steady State
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Given initial values for  F , l, xE and RE , we can compute the 22 parameters q, rK , s, K,
I, Y , w, RD, c, !E , GE , FE ,  E , GE0, FE0,  E0, nE , b, nB , d, RB and RF using equations
(1) to (22). We then solve the four-equation system consisting of (23)-(26) numerically for
 F , l, xE , and RE .
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Table 3: Calibration of Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Structural Parameters
 0.99 Household discount factor
 0.2 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
 0.3 Capital share in production
" 6 Substitutability between goods
p 20 Price adjustment cost
 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
k 2 Capital adjustment cost
Financial Parameters
E 0.06 Consumption share of wealth entrepreneurs
B 0.06 Consumption share of wealth bankers
E 0.3 Monitoring cost entrepreneurs
E 0.12 Idiosyncratic shock size entrepreneurs
 0.08 Bank capital requirement
Shock Parameters
A 0.0046 Size technology shock
A 0.9 Persistence technology shock
& 0.07 Size rm risk shock
& 0.9 Persistence rm risk shock
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Table 4: Implied Steady State Values
Variable Value Description
Interest Rates
R 1.0101 Policy rate
RD 1.0101 Return on deposits (earned by depositors)
RF 1.0144 Return on loans (earned by banks)
RE 1.0284 Return on capital (earned by entrepreneurs)
RB 1.0638 Return on equity (earned by bankers)
Annualised Spreads and Default Probability
400(RF -R) 1.7 Loan return spread p.a., in %
400(RE-R) 7.3 Capital return spread p.a., in %
400(RB-R) 21.5 Equity return spread p.a., in %
400FE 2.6 Default probability p.a., in %
Leverage
xE 0.7583 Leverage entrepreneurs
1   0.92 Leverage banks
Note: All interest rates and rates of return are gross rates.
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